

Title: Styles of representation, policy congruence and expectations about democracy: Parties and party voters

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Abstract

In this paper I analyse how different styles of representation emphasised within parties and policy congruence between parties and party voters explain the extent to which voters' expectations about democracy are fulfilled. Styles of representation are defined at the party level as the proportion of representatives within parties who are partisans, trustees or delegates. Policy congruence is defined as how close parties are to their voters on the left-right scale. My findings indicate that the more the partisan style is emphasised within parties the better are voters' expectations about democracy fulfilled. When the delegate style is prevalent, voters expectation about democracy are worse fulfilled, but the indicators remain weak and/or negligent as well as the trustee style. When policy congruence is high, voters' expectations about democracy are better fulfilled regardless of which style is prevalent within parties. Thus, the extent to which the partisan style is emphasised within parties and policy congruence are both strong movers of voter' fulfilment of democratic expectations.

Introduction

One of the distinguishing features of representative democracy is that voters, on the demand side of democracy, choose their representatives, at the supply side of democracy (Castiglione and Warren, 2006). This paper combines the demand and supply side of representation by analysing how different party characteristics explain the extent to which voters' expectations about democracy are fulfilled. This is based on that political parties are key actors in the intermediation of interests and policy preferences in modern democracies (e.g. Mair 2006). For that reason it is meaningful to examine the link between the structure and make-up of parties and their voters' expectations about democracy, as is undertaken here. To this end, I make use of studies about the nature and outcome of representation, as well as studies on the public's support and expectations about democracy. The nature of representation revolves about the relationship between representatives and the represented, while outcome of representation is about how representation manifests (Andeweg and Thomassen, 2005). I conceptualise the nature of representation as how to represent, here referred to as the styles of representation that are prevalent within parties; divided into the partisan, trustee and delegate styles. Policy congruence between parties and their voters conceptualised as how close parties and their voters are on the left-right as an objective outcome of representation. The main question is whether and how the nature and objective outcome of representation explain how well party voters' expectations about democracy are fulfilled as a subjective outcome of representation.

The discussion about styles of representation is closely linked to what democracy is about, both in normative terms and in practice how it works (Rozenberg and Blomgren, 2012). These debates are about, *inter alia*, what criterion elected representatives should use for decision making, whether they should use their own judgement, follow their respective party's policy or implement the will of the voters. Obscuring this debate is that representation

is, by its very nature, a collective representing a collective (Castiglione and Warren, 2006), but the implementation of representing is in the hands of individuals who constitute a collective. As such political parties are collectives who are created, maintained and altered by politicians, but at the same time they constrain the actions their members to follow the policies and rules of their party (Aldrich, 2011). The partisan-constituency model of representation emphasises that representation is carried out through parties (Ezrow, 2010). Within the representational link is the dyadic correspondence between parties and the parties' voters. Under that approach, the level of analysis in this paper is on the level of political parties and party voters, as the two collective groups who constitute the represented and the representatives or in other words the demand side and the supply side

The demand side of representation

It has been argued that political support, commonly measured as political trust and satisfaction with how democracy works, is crucial for the political system to function effectively (e.g. Mishler and Rose, 2001) and for the consolidation of democracy (e.g. Diamond, 1999). How political support is generated and maintained is a matter of debate, and whether it is on decline or not is disputed. Explanations for how political support is maintained and altered have been for example the cognitive mobilisation of citizens (Dalton, 2008), perceptions and/or level of corruption (Kubbe, 2013; Stokemer and Sundstrøm, 2013), and institutional effectiveness of the political system (Norris, 2011). A number of studies find a decrease in political support (e.g. Anderson, 2002; Dalton, 2008), others find no change at all or even an increase in political support (e.g. van Ham and Thomassen, 2014). Van Ham and Thomassen (2014) call for new and different explanations for political support, such as whether it is explained by different characteristics of citizens between and within countries, as well as macro factors such as economic performance of the states, corruption and public

service provision. They base this on their findings of no clear universal decline since the early seventies in political trust, satisfaction with democracy and other related indicators. However, there is a huge country variation in political support in their study, indicating that it is not a concept where one size fits all. The country variation they find could also mean that the mover(s) of political support is not universal; that it rather depends on different factors within different political contexts.

Canache, Mondak and Seligson (2001) criticise the measure, 'satisfaction with democracy', for its limited capacity to draw meaningful inferences about support. Their reasoning is that it is unknown what aspects of democracy it does measure support for and that its substantive content varies both between individuals and countries. They go as far as stating that the indicator is meaningless in comparative research. Anderson's (2002) response to this is that while it is well known that different aspects of democracy are captured by this measure, it is still meaningful as an indicator about the overall support for the functioning of democracy within countries. As pointed out by Anderson, the problem lies more with the theories about what generates satisfaction with democracy and less with the measurement itself.

It is clear that in order to advance our understanding of what generates political support we need a more nuanced view of both the different yardsticks people use to evaluate democracy and what factors of the political systems explain how well democratic expectations are met. Bavisker and Malone (2004) make an important distinction between support for the means of democracy (such as free and fair elections and universal suffrage) as minimum requirements for democracy and the ends of democracy (such as social rights and policy responsiveness) as maximum requirements. Analysing the difference in peoples' emphasis on the means or ends of democracy in four Latin-American countries (Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Guatemala) they show this difference is important for support for the

political regime. Those who emphasize means of democracy over its ends are more likely to oppose a military coup in their country. This is in line with Fuchs (1999) findings for East and West Germany, with the former placing stronger emphasis on the ends of democracy resulting in less support for the incumbent government of the unified Germany.

Bavisker and Malone's (2004) findings along with Fuchs' (1999) underlines the importance of taking into account the differences in peoples' understandings and expectations about democracy when analysing political support. In this paper I take the analysis a step further and examine whether and how different workings of political parties do explain how well their voters' expectations of democracy are met. Based on that a high level of political support is important for representative democracy to function effectively and that political parties are one of the main actors in representative democracy, specifically in Europe (e.g. Dalton, 1985), it is a clear avenue for the research to analyse how those two phenomena are linked. This I base on the assumptions that peoples' expectations of democracy play a vital role in explaining their support for democracy in their respective countries and that representation is carried out through political parties.

The supply side of representation

Since the early days of representative studies, a distinction between the trustee and delegate style of representation has been prominent (e.g. Wahlke et al., 1962; Eulau and Karps, 1977; Andeweg, 2012). The trustee style refers to elected representatives who use their own judgement when taking decisions on behalf of their constituents. The delegate style assumes that the representatives follow the will of the voters regardless of their own opinions. In Converse and Pierce's (1986) study on representation in France they add the partisan style as the third style, arguing that a threefold distinction between partisans, delegates and trustees is closer to capturing a reality of representation compared to using only the two former ones.

Studies of these kinds commonly focus on individual representatives and how different party characteristics and settings of electoral systems explain representatives' role-perception and behaviour as elected representatives.

In the literature about representatives' role-perception, numerous roles have been suggested and analysed along with the trustee, delegate and partisan styles, such as purposive roles (Wahlke et al., 1962), preference roles (Searing, 1994), and policy representation interest representation (Thomassen and Esaiasson, 2006). Rozenberg and Blomgren (2012) propose a useful distinction between legislative roles and representative roles. The former focuses on MPs work in the parliament and the latter on how and whom to represent. This distinction acknowledges that representatives can hold different role-perceptions under different circumstances and it clarifies what kinds of roles are analysed, what explains them and what are their consequences for representation. Importantly, roles are not random distributions of individuals' beliefs, they articulate collective norms and values. Strøm (2012) classifies different roles which representatives take on as strategies to help them reach their goals, whether those are (re-)election, (re-)selection as candidates or to gain/maintain a party office. In Strøm's rational choice approach representatives have certain preferences for an outcome, but their means to realise these preferences are conditioned by the institutions within which they operate. Two clear factors that condition their means to reach their goals are the stipulations of the electoral system and their parties' control over nomination and over other career paths for and within the party.

Zittel (2012) finds that the electoral system affects candidates' role-perception, with them to be more prone to emphasise a partisan style the less chance they have for winning a single-seat district. Wessels and Giebler (2011) reach a similar conclusion, and also find a party socialisation effect, with longer party membership resulting in a greater likelihood of candidates to adopt a partisan style. Önnudóttir (2013) shows that characteristics of parties

and party voters do explain which styles of representation are emphasised within parties. She finds that the more control parties have over nomination and the greater the party socialisation the more likely it is that the partisan style is prevalent within parties.

Government-seeking parties contain a higher number of trustees and delegate parties have a large group of party voters who do identify with those parties. Önnudóttir (2014) also finds, using an objective measure for policy congruence¹, that a higher proportion of trustees within parties increases congruence on left-right between parties and voters, while partisan parties have less congruence.

Styles of representation are thus influenced by both the setting of the electoral system as well as characteristics of parties and party voters, and they are related to how well voters are represented on the continuum of left-right. Based on that parties are on the supply side of democracy and voters on the demand side, styles of representation clearly belong to the supply side while policy congruence is influenced by both sides. As such, congruence can be pictured as a link between the two sides. This paper shows to which extent these two phenomena, styles of representation and policy congruence explain how well voters' democratic expectations are fulfilled.

The workings of political parties and democratic expectations

The partisan style is in line with the Responsible Party Model (RPM) which was classified in the 1950s as an ideal model for how representation should work (American Political Science Association, 1950). RPM assumes that parties, as the supply side, offer different policies to

¹ The measure of policy congruence is objective because she uses two separate sources for voters (self-placement) and parties' placements (as placed by their candidates) and by that she reduces the threat of an endogeneity bias in her models.

voters who are on the demand side. Voters choose the party that is closest to their own policy preferences and the parties' representatives carry out the policy of their parties. In RPM, political parties are the uniting link between the policy preferences of voters and representatives. The requirements of RPM for successful representation has been criticised both for the fact that it does not give room for voters to choose parties based on other factors than their own or the parties' policy preferences, nor does it offer flexibility for individual MPs to deviate from their party's policy(ies) (e.g. Bengtsson and Wass, 2011; Valen and Narud, 2007). While this criticism has some truth to it, parties do constrain politicians in their actions (Aldrich, 2011) and it has been established that partisan representatives are closer to their own party on policy (Wessels and Giebler, 2011) - lending at least a partial support for RPM as a model of representation. If RPM is a successful model for representation, voters' expectations about democracy should be better fulfilled when the parties' representatives implement their party's policy or in other words, when representatives are partisans:

H1: The higher the proportion of partisans within parties the better are party voters' expectations about democracy fulfilled.

The delegate style assumes that voters' opinion should be followed regardless of representatives own opinion or the party's policy. The delegate style has been criticized for being over-demanding, assuming that voters have stable and exogenous policy preferences (Andeweg and Thomassen, 2005) and it is far from clear how those demands should be made known to representatives. A popular debate about how representation ought to work quite often revolves around the delegate style being the ideal type for representation; the will of the voters should be decisive in policy making. Linked to that is the debate about "direct democracy", quite often using referendums as an example (e.g. Matsusaka, 2005; Feld and

Kirchgässner, 2001) – and by “direct democracy” citizens get a more “direct” access to policy making. Underlying this is the general idea that, through the use of referendums, the will of the voters can be better realised. However, greater access of the public via referendums and other means of more “direct democracy” do not necessarily result in more informed decisions as they often lack in time spent on deliberation (LeDuc, 2006).

Based on the popularity of the delegate style in public discussion the question here is whether those parties who promote the delegate style do in reality fulfil its voters expectations about democracy better compared to those who emphasise the partisan or trustee style. The complexity of the issue space and how exactly voters signal their will to elected representatives gives little reason to believe that voters of parties where the delegate style is prevalent evaluate democracy more positively compared to other voters. On the contrary, it can be assumed that voters’ expectations about democracy are less fulfilled when a party has a high proportion of delegates because of the uncertainty about how parties who promote the delegate style will make decisions as they neither follow a known policy position of the party nor do their representatives follow a known position of their own. Instead they claim to follow the will of the voters, which is both diverse and unknown. Thus, I hypothesise that when parties promote the delegate style their voters’ expectations about democracy are less fulfilled, or:

H2: The higher the proportion of delegates within parties the less are voters’ expectations about democracy fulfilled.

The trustee style assumes that representatives use their own judgement when making policy decisions and as such deviates from the partisan and delegate style where the sources for decision making are collectives. Inherent in the trustee style is that representatives get a

mandate from voters to make informed decisions based on their own deliberation. Rozenberg and Blomgren (2012) argue that a decline in what they call “partyiness” and the increasing heterogeneity of constituents could promote the utility of trustee style. Modernisation and an increase in post-materialist values are more in line with the trustee style promoting the idea of sincerity, self-autonomy, individual fulfilment and genuine deliberation as opposed to following instructions of a collective such as a party or constituents. The increasing complexity of the issue space along with a growing number of independent voters as opposed to voters who hold partisan attachment has created what Rohrschneider and Whitefield call the “strain of representation”. Parties in modern democracies are to an increasing extent competing for and representing diverse voters and the strain is the dilemma about how to represent both the median independent voter and the partisan ideological voter. The median independent voters are less polarised in their issue positions compared to party identifiers, who are also closer to their party on a left-right scale. Under this strain parties might be prone to promote the trustee style in order to secure the votes of both groups. By promoting the trustee style they might stand a better chance to secure the votes of both groups of voters. This line of argument hinges on the idea that trustee style is promoted because of the heterogeneity of voters as well as the complexity of the issue-space and that those parties want to maximise their electoral success. If that is so, it gives a reason to believe that voters’ expectations and evaluations about democracy are diverse as well and therefore to expect when the trustee style is prevalent it has a negligible relation with how well party voters expectations about democracy are fulfilled, or:

H3: The proportion of trustees within parties has a negligible effect on how well party voters’ expectations about democracy are fulfilled.

Policy congruence as the outcome of representation is viewed as a link between the demand side (voters) and supply side (political elites) of democracy (Welzel and Klingeman, 2011) and is commonly examined as how close parties and party voters are on the left-right scale (e.g. Ezrow, 2010). The left-right dimension is a super-issue covering a broad range of diverse issues; many of them evolving around the role of the state in the economy (e.g. van der Eijk and Schmitt, 2010; Hellwig, 2008). With increasing de-alignment, depolarisation on the left-right dimension, increasing complexity of the issue-space and post-industrialisation it has been suggested that the left-right ideology might be now less salient than it used to be (e.g. Hellwig, 2008). However Schmitt and Freiré (2012) show that the importance of ideological polarisation on the left-right is different within Europe, where it is increasing in the East, on a decline in the centre and varies in the South. This along with the understanding that partisan voters are closer to their parties on policy congruence compared to independent voters (Rohrschneider and Whitefield, 2012) shows that left-right congruence is still meaningful but the strength of this bond is dependent upon types of party voters and the political systems the parties operate within. The question here is whether congruence on the left-right scale, as an objective manifestation of the link between the supply and demand sides of representation, explains how well party voters' expectations about democracy are fulfilled as a subjective outcome of representation. Thus I hypothesise:

H4: The more policy congruence between parties and party voters the better are voters' expectations about democracy fulfilled.

Another reason for including policy congruence in this study is to control for a possible bias in its effect on styles for representation. As already discussed Önnudóttir (2014) finds that higher congruence between parties and voters goes together with a higher proportion of

trustees within parties and partisan parties have less congruence; and Rohrschneider and Whitefield's (2012) show that partisan voters are closer to their parties on policy congruence compared to independent voters. For those reasons it can be argued that policy congruence on left-right, using an the same objective measure as Önnudóttir does, should be controlled for in an attempt to isolate the effect of styles of representation on democratic expectations from policy congruence.

Research design

This paper makes use of various data sources, with the main ones being the European Social Survey (n.d.) (ESS) round six and the Comparative Candidates Survey (n.d.) (CCS).

Combined ESS and CCS cover in total 60 parties from nine countries: Belgium 2007, Denmark 2011, Germany 2009, Iceland 2009, Ireland 2007, the Netherlands 2006, Portugal 2009, Sweden 2010 and Switzerland 2011. I pair parties and party voters into party dyads, linking the candidates' party from the CCS data to voters of the same party in the ESS. In three out of the nine countries, the question about vote-recall in the ESS data does not cover the same election as in the CCS data. Those three countries and elections are Belgium, Ireland and the Netherlands and I include a dummy for them in the models to control for a possible bias arising from the time lag between the CCS and ESS data.

Party voters' expectations about democracy

In ESS round six from 2012 there is a battery of 20 questions that do tap into both expectations about different aspects of democracy and evaluations of those same factors in each country included. The first half of the items ask about the importance of each factor for democracy on an 11 point scale (0=not important at all for democracy, 10=extremely important for democracy), capturing voters' expectations about democracy. The latter half

asks about the status of the factors in respondents' respective country on an 11 point scale (0=does not apply at all, 10=applies completely), capturing voters' evaluations of democracy. In this paper I use the distance between party voters' expectations about democracy and their evaluation of it in their country as a measure for how well or bad their expectations are met.

Those holding high expectations about democracy naturally demand more of the political system compared to those with low expectations. A cursory glance at the means and standard deviations for each question shows that for all items the mean expectations are higher than the mean evaluations (table 1). For all items except 'the media are free to criticise the government' and 'voters should discuss politics with people they know before making decisions', is the variance higher on evaluations than on expectations. This indicates that the main variance in how well citizens' expectations are met are influenced by their evaluations of democracy and to a lesser extent their expectations.

*Table 1 about here.*²

² There are four additional pairs of questions in the same battery, asking about the importance and evaluation of specific aspects of democracy. Those are: 1) citizens have a final say on political issues by voting directly in referendums, 2) politicians take into account the views of other European government before making decisions, 3) government protects all citizens against poverty and 4) government takes measures to reduce differences in income level. Question 1 in the sequence here is excluded because the evaluation of it depends on the frequency of referendums in each country. Question 2 is excluded because it depends on how integrated the countries are in European affairs. Questions 3 and 4 are excluded because they measure social justice and responses to those depend on respondents' placements on the the traditional left-right spectrum about the role of the government in the economy and as such should be treated as a separate scale.

Table 2 shows the loadings of each item on a one-factor solution for expectations about democracy and evaluations of it. The factor loadings are in all cases .50 or over and in both cases the items explain 40% of the variance or more in the factors. Table 2 also shows that the reliability statistics Cronbach's alpha is over .83 for democratic expectations and .85 for democratic evaluations, confirming that the ten items in both factor solutions are highly correlated. In the next step, I create a scale that captures the distance between democratic expectations and evaluations. This I do by first subtracting respondents' evaluations of democracy from their expectations on each pair of questions. In those cases when evaluation exceeds expectation (expectation over-fulfilled) I recode them to 0, indicating that expectations are met.³ This results in 11 point scales with 10 as the highest point (maximum distance between expectations and evaluations) and 0 the lowest (expectations fulfilled). In the next step I compute a combined scale for each respondent that captures the mean distance for all ten items between expectations and evaluations, here labelled as '*the fulfilment of democratic expectations*'. For the calculation of this scale, I include only those respondents who answer all 20 questions about expectations and evaluations.⁴ Cronbach's alpha for '*the fulfilment of democratic expectations*' is .80. Third and final step is to compute the means on the scale for each group of party voters, where higher values indicate that democratic expectations are worse fulfilled and lower values that they are better fulfilled.⁵

³ The range for when democratic evaluations exceed expectations is from 4.1% for 'the courts treats everyone the same' to 26.4% for 'the media is free to criticise the government'.

⁴ 86.1% of the respondents reply to all twenty questions about democratic expectations and evaluations.

⁵ The range of values between parties on this scale is from 1.12 to 4.33.

Figure 1 shows the mean values on the scale for how well democratic expectations are met for each country and the distribution of the party means within the countries. There is obviously a country variation in how well voters' expectations are met and the party voters' means gravitate towards the country means. For that reason I calculate for each group of party voters the absolute distance between their means on democratic expectations and the country mean on the same scale. I include this measure in my model to control for a possible bias due to the country variation in voters' evaluations of democracy. A table showing the means for each group of party voters as well as values for all other variables used in this study is in Appendix I.

Figure 1 about here

Styles of representation

For styles of representations emphasised within parties I make use of three questions from the CCS project. Those are about how an MP should vote in parliament if there are different opinions between:

1. The party position and his/her party voters' opinion.
2. Constituency voters' opinion and MP's opinion.
3. Party position and MP's opinion.

For each of the three styles, partisan, trustee and delegate, I use two out of the three questions. Those who name the party in items 1 and 3 are partisans, those say that the MP should vote according to his own opinion when contrasted with voters and party in items 2

and 3 are trustees, and those who say that the MP should follow the voters'⁶ view in items 1 and 2 are delegates. The representatives who cannot be categorised according to this rule are coded as “non-classifiable”.

Instead of listing all the parties here and the distribution of the styles within them, table 3 shows an example from Belgium. Party measures on styles of representation are derived at by calculating the proportions of representatives within parties who are: 1) partisans, 2) delegates or 3) trustees. An example of party measures for the Socialist Party in Belgium is 39.0 for the proportion of partisans, 34.2 for the proportion of trustees and 12.2 for the proportion of delegates.

Table 3 about here

Policy congruence

Policy congruence is calculated as the absolute distance between the mean of the party as placed by its candidates on the left-right scale reported in the CCS data and the mean self-placement of party voters.⁷ This is the same objective measure used by Önnudóttir (2014) for policy congruence. She argues that by using separate data sources for the left-right position of party and party voters an endogeneity bias caused by assimilation (when respondents pull their preferred group closer towards them) or contrast effects (when respondents push non-preferred groups away from their own position) is prevented. It is of importance to capture

⁶ “Constituency voters” and “his/her party voters” are both referred to as voters in this paper.

⁷ The formula for policy congruence using the means is: $LRDP_m = |V_m - P_m|$. $LRDP_m$ is the absolute left-right distance, V_m is the mean-left-right placement of party voters and P_m is the mean left-right placement of the party as placed by its candidates. The scales for left-right are on an 11-point scale, ranging from 0 (left) to 10 (right).

policy congruence as close as possible to the elections covered in the CCS. Thus I make use of national election studies data where it is possible. For five out of nine countries information about voters' left-right placement is available in the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (n.d.) (CSES) data covering the same election as in the CCS data. Those five countries are Germany, Iceland, Ireland, the Netherlands and Portugal. For Sweden and Switzerland I use the countries national election studies, covering the same election.⁸ The policy position of voters from Belgium is from the European Election Study (n.d.) (EES) 2009 and for Danish voters from the ESS 2012, both carried out two years after a the general election covered in the CCS data.

Additional control variables

Political representation in a cleavage-based democracy is based on descriptive representation and that policy congruence is high on those issues that are part of a shared value system between the representatives and the represented (van Ham and Thomassen, 2014). This means that for social class parties, such as socialist/communist parties, congruence should be high on materialist left-right issues. Both Gauja (2012) and Wessels and Giebler (2011) find that traditional left-wing parties are more likely to emphasise the partisan style whether that is due that those parties are in general more centralised and cadre-like (Wessels and Giebler, 2011) or due to that the partisan style is more line with the ideology of the “old” left, whereas representatives from the “new” left tend to adopt the trustee style (Gauja, 2012). For those reasons I contrast left-wing parties (socialist/communist and social democratic parties) with other party types using the classification of party families from the Comparative Manifesto Project (CMP) (n.d.).

⁸ Data assessed from the Swedish National Election Studies (n.d.) and from FORS (n.d.) for Swiss voters.

Önnudóttir (2013) finds that parties who are more often represented in government promote the trustee style. This could be so because government-seeking parties socialise their representatives into thinking for the greater good as a result of their frequent representation in government. It is also possible that government-seeking parties utilise the trustee style as a strategy to maximise their electoral success, capturing both the votes of partisan voters and independent voters. It has also been shown that voters of government parties are in general more satisfied with how democracy works (e.g. Holmberg, 1999) and it is quite possible that the same effect is found for democratic expectations. Thus I control for the frequency of parties' representation in government, operationalising the measure as the proportion of days the parties have been represented in government in the four electoral terms preceding the election under study.⁹

In the end, I control for the proportionality of the electoral system. Wessels and Schmitt (2008) show that the wider and more numerous the policy options are that voters can choose from, along with a closer fit between the electorate and their voting options on the left-right, the more meaningful their vote is. Variety in policy options, as captured by the number of effective parties, could bring about a closer fit between voters' expectations about democracy and their evaluation of it. For that reason, I include a measure of the number of effective parties, using the relative seat share of parties in the parliament.¹⁰

⁹ Information on the number of days parties have been represented in government is from the Parliament and Government Composition Database (n.d.) (ParlGov).

¹⁰ The number of effective parliamentary parties is calculated as such:
$$\text{parties} = 1 / \sum ((\text{proportion of seats in the parliament})^2).$$

Party characteristics and voters' expectations about democracy

To test my hypotheses about the effect of styles of representation and policy congruence on how well voters' expectations about democracy are fulfilled, I use Ordinary Least Square (OLS) regressions. The proportions for styles of representation within parties are not independent of each other; a higher proportion in one group is followed by lower proportions in the other two groups. Thus the regressions are done separately for each style group in five steps. In the first two steps I add the explanatory variables. In the third step the control variables for party type and parties' representation in government are added. The fourth step adds the control variable for the distance between the party voters' means and country means on fulfilment of democratic expectations. In the fifth step the control variables for the countries are entered (number of effective parties and a dummy for the countries where the ESS data does not cover the same election as in the CCS data). The parties included are not chosen randomly and therefore the significance levels are only meaningful as indicators about the strength of the relationship between the explanatory variables and the response variable for those 60 parties that are part of my models.

The first hypothesis (H1), that the higher proportion of partisans within parties the better are party voters expectations about democracy met is supported (table 4). Explained variance (R^2) is only .07 with just the proportion of partisans in the first step, but the effect (Beta) is stable in all the remaining steps and is even a little bit stronger in the full model (step five). The direction of the effect of the proportion of delegates within parties on whether democratic expectations are fulfilled is in the expected direction, with democratic expectations worse fulfilled the higher the proportion of delegates there is within parties, in all five steps of the models (H2). However this effect is non-significant in the last step when the adding the number of effective parties and the control variable for Belgium, Ireland and the Netherlands. The effect is strongest in the first step of the model (Beta=.39) and explains

15% of the variance in democratic expectations. The effect of proportion of delegates drops to a weak effect in the fourth step when controlling for the distance between the party voters' means and country means on democratic expectations and to a negligent effect when adding control variables for the countries. The second hypothesis is thus not supported in the full model. The effect (Beta) of the proportion of delegates drops most notably in step four when the control for the distance between the means of party voters' and country means on democratic expectations is added to the model. This could indicate that a country variation in democratic expectations is more strongly related to how well they are fulfilled compared to the proportion of delegates within parties. Whether the results will remain the same if more parties are added to the model is beyond the scope of this paper but a clear avenue for a future research.

Table 4 about here

The proportion of trustees has a negligent effect in the full model on whether democratic expectations are fulfilled or not supporting my third hypothesis (H3). The effect of the proportion of trustees on democratic expectations is negligent in all steps except the fourth one, where it has a weak relation with democratic expectations. The substantial change in the coefficient in step four might indicate that after controlling for a variation in how far parties' voters are from the country mean on democratic expectations, those parties who contain a high proportion of trustee do worse when it comes to fulfilment of democratic expectations, contrary to the negligent effect hypothesised about here (H3). However this effect weakens to non-significance when controlling for the number of effective parties and Belgium, Ireland and the Netherlands.

The greater proximity on left-right between parties and party voters, the better are party voters' expectations' about democracy fulfilled supporting my fourth and final hypothesis. Policy congruence is clearly meaningful for how well parties' voters democratic expectations are met regardless of which of the three styles are prevalent within parties. Explained variance (R^2) changes substantially in the fourth step of all three models when adding the control variable for the country variation in democratic expectations and this underlines the importance that this variance is accounted for as is done here.

In figures 2 and 3 the predicted values for democratic expectations for styles of representation and policy congruence are plotted from the final steps (steps 5) of the regression models in table 4, holding all other values at their means. The ranges of styles of representation are not the same between them all. The partisan style ranges from 4.2% to 66.7%, the delegate from 0% to 40% and the trustee style from 0% to 79.5%. Therefore I plot the predicted values for the fulfilment of democratic expectations using different high points on the range for styles of representation, rounding up or down to the next ten (figure 2). The range of policy congruence in the data is from .01 to 2.51 and for that reason I use zero as the lowest value for policy congruence and 2.51 as the highest when calculating the predicted values for the fulfilment of democratic expectations.

Figure 2 shows that when the proportion of partisans is zero predicted value is 2.3 for how well democratic expectations are fulfilled. As the proportion of partisans increases the closer is the fit between party voters' expectations and evaluations of democracy, going down to as close as 1.4 when the proportion of partisans is 70%. The direction of the weak and/or negligent effects of the proportions of delegates and trustees is the same; the higher the proportions of those two styles the worse are democratic expectations met.

Figure 2 about here

Figure 3 about here

Figure 3 shows that the effects of policy congruence on how well democratic expectations are fulfilled are the same in all three models (partisans, trustees and delegates). The almost identical slopes of policy congruence for all three models lends support to that the effect policy congruence on democratic expectations is stable and independent of which style is prevalent within parties. It is noteworthy that in the partisan model that when congruence is high (0) the democratic expectations are worse fulfilled (2.1) compared when congruence is high from the delegate and trustee models that are almost the same (1.6 and 1.7). This could be read as that while parties who contain a high number of partisan candidates do better when it comes to democratic fulfilment of their voters, those parties have lower policy congruence compared to the other two styles, hinting at a possible interaction effect between the partisan style of representation and policy congruence. To test for that I run an additional regression for the partisan style and include an interaction term between that style and policy congruence. Resulting in a significant interaction term (see regression model in Appendix II) I plot the predicted values for democratic expectations, contrasting parties with high congruence (less than 1) with those where congruence is low (1 or more) (figure 4). A higher proportion of partisans results in both cases that democratic expectations are better met, but this effect is stronger for those parties who have low congruence with their voters. Dropping the outlier in the upper right corner (Left Bloc from Portugal) does not change these results. This means that the additional gain of the partisan style is stronger for those parties with low congruence, while it has a less additional gain for those parties where congruence is high, at least for those sixty parties included in my study. Nevertheless, the direction of the effect is

the same, both for parties with high and low congruence, supporting that the democratic expectations of voters are better met when the partisan style is emphasised within parties.

Figure 4 about here

Conclusion

In this paper, I have established that when the partisan style of representation is prevalent within parties and when policy congruence between parties and party voters is high, the parties' voters democratic expectations are better fulfilled. The proportion of the delegate style does seem to have a negligent effect on democratic expectations contrary to the expectation that it would go together with democratic expectations being worse fulfilled. The trustee style has, as hypothesised, a negligent relation with how well democratic expectations are met.

The effect of the partisan style on democratic expectations lends support to there being some truth to the Responsible Party Model (RPM), which assumes that the most optimal way for representation is that politicians follow their parties' policies. Perhaps voters of partisan parties are the "true" RPM voters in the sense that those that cast their vote for a party that is closest to their own policy preferences, while other voters use a different criterion when casting their vote. If the partisan style is driven by characteristics of the parties, such as centralisation of the nomination process and party socialisation (Önnudóttir 2013), it means that the party has a greater control over their politicians. Regular voters of such parties should thus be used that their elected representatives follow their parties' policy and could possibly explain why their democratic expectations are better fulfilled compared to voters of other parties. Interestingly the strength of the effect of the proportion of style of partisans within parties depends on the degree of policy congruence between parties and their

voters. When policy congruence is low, this effect is stronger. This indicates that low congruence as an objective manifestation of representation is made up for in party voters' democratic expectations as a subjective outcome of representation, when parties promote the partisan style.

The proportion of delegates has a negligent effect, contrary to what was expected, on whether democratic expectations are fulfilled or not. Nevertheless, this negligent effect goes against the popular debate that commonly refers to that the "will of the public" should be decisive in politicians' work and supports the idea that there is too much uncertainty involved regarding the delegate style, even if it does not result in the full model in that democratic expectations are worse fulfilled. The proportion of trustees within parties also has a negligible effect on how well their voters' expectations about democracy are met. It might be the case that increasing heterogeneity among voters and the increasing complexity of the issue space encourages parties who are government-seeking to promote the trustee style in order to maximise their electoral success. If so, it gives a reason to believe that voters of trustee parties are also diverse in their expectations and evaluations about democracy – and for that reason the proportion of trustees has a diverse effect on how well democratic expectations are met.

I do show that policy congruence is meaningful for how well voters' expectations about democracy are fulfilled. The closer the fit between parties and party voters on the left-right scale, the better are their expectations about democracy met. This means that despite the de-alignment and alleged decreasing saliency of the left-right dimension in modern democracies, it is still meaningful as a common denominator between parties and party voters. Parties who are objectively closer to their voters on the left-right are also those where their voters' expectations about democracy are better fulfilled, independent of which style is emphasised within parties.

The novelty of the approach taken in this paper is to examine how well democratic expectations about democracy are met on the party level based on the fact that representation is about a collective representing a collective. Therefore it gives a valuable insight into how different workings of parties affects the subjective fulfilment of democratic expectations. What I have shown here is that the nature of representation, when the partisan style is prevalent within parties, and policy congruence as an objective outcome of representation do have positive consequences for political support here conceptualised as how well parties' voters expectations about democracy are fulfilled. This clearly shows that parties' characteristics should not be ignored when examining political support, whether that is democratic expectations as in this paper or other more common factors such as democratic satisfaction or political trust.

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Tables and figures






Figure 1. Country voters' and party voters' means for how well democratic expectations about democracy are fulfilled




Note: The predicted values are calculated from steps five in the three regression models presented in table 4. The range in the data for fulfilment of democratic expectations is from 1.12 to 4.33, where a higher number indicates that expectations are worse fulfilled. The ranges for styles of representations are 4.2% to 66.7% for partisans, 0% to 40% for delegates and 0% to 79.5% for trustees.

Figure 2. Predicted values for fulfilments of democratic expectations for the proportions of partisans, trustees and delegates within parties



Note: The predicted values are calculated from steps five in the three regression models presented in table 4. The range in the data for fulfilment of democratic expectations is from 1.12 to 4.33, where a higher number indicates that expectations are worse fulfilled. The range for policy congruence is .01 to 2.51 where a higher number indicates lower congruence.

Figure 3. Predicted values for fulfilments of democratic expectations for policy congruence



Note: The predicted values are calculated from the regression model in Appendix II .The range in the data for fulfilment of democratic expectations is from 1.12 to 4.33, where a higher number indicates that expectations are worse fulfilled. The range for the partisan style is from 4.2% to 66.7% .

Figure 4. Interaction effect between the partisan style and policy congruence on the fulfilment of democratic expectations

Table 1. Expectations and evaluations of democracy, means and standard deviations

	Expectations:		Evaluations:		Expectations subtracted from evaluations:	
	Means	Standard deviations	Means	Standard deviations	Means - difference	Standard deviations - difference
National elections are free and fair	9.0	1.58	8.4	2.02	-0.7	0.44
Voters discuss politics with people they know before deciding how to vote	7.5	2.32	6.5	2.22	-1.0	-0.10
Different political parties offer clear alternatives to one another	7.6	2.11	5.9	2.24	-1.7	0.14
Opposition parties are free to criticise the government	8.6	1.81	8.3	1.86	-0.3	0.05
The media are free to criticise the government	8.3	2.08	8.2	1.99	-0.1	-0.09
The media provide citizens with reliable information to judge the government	8.9	1.66	6.6	2.26	-2.3	0.60
The rights of minority groups are protected	8.8	1.68	6.9	2.21	-1.9	0.53
The courts treat everyone the same	9.4	1.27	6.3	2.84	-3.1	1.57
Governing parties are punished in elections when they have done a bad job	8.4	1.92	6.2	2.75	-2.1	0.84
The government explains its decisions to voters	9.0	1.45	5.1	2.53	-3.8	1.08

Note: Data is weighted by design weight (dweight) and population weight (pweight). Information about weight in the ESS data are from the ESS website (<http://www.europeansocialsurvey.org/data/download.html?r=6>). The analysis is constricted to those who are 18 or older. Program used: SPSS 20.

Table 2. One factor solutions for democratic expectations and evaluations

	Democratic expectations	Democratic evaluations
National elections are free and fair	.73	.65
Voters discuss politics with people they know before deciding how to vote	.53	.50
Different political parties offer clear alternatives to one another	.50	.58
Opposition parties are free to criticise the government	.78	.65
The media are free to criticise the government	.70	.63
The media provide citizens with reliable information to judge the government	.78	.64
The rights of minority groups are protected	.74	.69
The courts treat everyone the same	.67	.67
Governing parties are punished in elections when they have done a bad job	.53	.62
The government explains its decisions to voters	.64	.64
% of explained variance	45	40
Cronbach's alpha	.85	.83

*Extraction method: Principal component analysis. Factors restricted to 1. Data is weighted by design weight (dweight) and population weight (pweight). Information about weight in the ESS data are from the ESS website (<http://www.europeansocialsurvey.org/data/download.html?r=6>). The analysis is constricted to those who are 18 or older. Program used: SPSS 20.

Table 3. Styles of representation within parties, an example from Belgium

	% of partisans	% of trustees	% of delegates	% of non-classifiables	N
<i>Belgium</i>					
Socialist Party	39.0	34.2	12.2	14.6	41
Reformist Movement	28.3	32.6	13.0	26.1	46
Humanist Democratic Center	44.4	33.3	8.3	13.9	36
Ecolo	47.7	27.3	2.3	22.7	44
Christian Democratic and Flemish	41.7	31.3	16.7	10.4	48
New-Flemish Alliance	20.0	33.3	40.0	6.7	15
Soicalist Party. Different - SP.A	57.1	28.6	14.3	0.0	35
Open VLD (Flemish Liberals and Democrats)	32.0	30.0	28.0	10.0	50
Flemist Interest	38.2	29.4	23.5	8.8	34
Green!	32.1	48.2	12.5	7.2	56

Note: See a list for all parties in Appendix I

Table 4. Determinants of how well party voters' expectations about democracy are fulfilled

Step:	Standardized Betas					Standardized Betas					Standardized Betas				
	1	2	3	4	5	1	2	3	4	5	1	2	3	4	5
<i>% of party representatives who are:</i>															
Partisans	-.27*	-.35**	-.40**	-.33**	-.33**										
Trustees											-.04	.10	.13	.20+	.16
Delegates						.39**	.32**	.32**	.20+	.14					
<i>Parties and party voters</i>															
Policy congruence		.42**	.34**	.30**	.27*		.28*	.22+	.21+	.26*		.39**	.32*	.31**	.31**
<i>Party variables</i>															
Socialist/communist party/social democratic party			.30**	.20*	.17+			.26*	.17	.13			.27*	.17	.12
Representation in government			-.18	-.14	-.10			-.10	-.07	-.02			-.15	-.11	-.05
Distance between party voters' mean on expectations about democracy and the country means				.43***	.45***				.42***	.45***			.50***	.51***	
<i>Country variables</i>															
Number of effective parties					-.23*					-.17					-.22+
Dummy variable for Belgium, Ireland and the Netherlands					.06					-.12					-.06
Intercept, p-value	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.001	.000
R ² :	.07	.24	.35	.52	.56	.15	.22	.30	.45	.51	.002	.13	.22	.45	.51
Change in R2 significant, p value:	.041	.001	.014	.000	.102	.002	.022	.069	.000	.066	.758	.005	.061	.000	.060

Note: Response variable is the fulfilment of party voters' democratic expectations with lower values indicating that they are worse fulfilled. Significance levels: +p<0.1; *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001. N=60 parties.

Appendix I

Table 5. All party and country variables

	The fulfilment of democratic expectations; higher values=worse fulfilled	Number of responses in the CCS data (candidates)	% of partisans	% of trustees	% of delegates	% of non- classifiables	Policy congruence, 0=high congruence, 10=low congruence	Socialist/com munist/social democratic party	Ratio of representa- tion in government in the four preceding electoral terms	Country means for the fulfilment of democratic expecations	Number of effective parties
<i>Belgium</i>											
Socialist Party	2.3	41	39.0	34.2	12.2	14.6	0.5	Yes	1	2.0	7.9
Reformist Movement	2.6	46	28.3	32.6	13.0	26.1	1.0	No	0.4	2.0	7.9
Humanist Democratic Center	2.2	36	44.4	33.3	8.3	13.9	0.7	No	0.65	2.0	7.9
Ecolo	2.6	44	47.7	27.3	2.3	22.7	0.7	No	0.2	2.0	7.9
Christian Democratic and Flemish	1.5	48	41.7	31.3	16.7	10.4	0.3	No	0.65	2.0	7.9
New-Flemish Alliance	1.9	15	20.0	33.3	40.0	6.7	1.3	No	0	2.0	7.9
Soicalist Party. Different - SP.A	1.7	35	57.1	28.6	14.3	0.0	0.7	Yes	1	2.0	7.9
Open VLD (Flemish Liberals and Democrats)	1.5	50	32.0	30.0	28.0	10.0	0.2	No	0.4	2.0	7.9
Flemist Interest	2.1	34	38.2	29.4	23.5	8.8	2.4	No	0	2.0	7.9
Green!	1.8	56	32.1	48.2	12.5	7.2	2.4	No	0.2	2.0	7.9
<i>Denmark</i>											
Danish Social Democrats	1.4	21	47.6	42.9	4.8	4.7	0.6	Yes	0.24	1.4	5.9
Danish Social-Liberal Party	1.4	23	26.1	65.2	8.7	0.0	0.1	No	0.24	1.4	5.9
Conservative Party	1.3	25	24.0	72.0	4.0	0.0	0.2	No	0.76	1.4	5.9
Socialist People's Party	1.6	28	35.7	64.3	0.0	0.0	0.4	Yes	0	1.4	5.9
Danish Peoples Party	1.7	32	56.3	40.6	0.0	3.1	0.2	No	0	1.4	5.9
Venstre	1.3	22	22.7	77.3	0.0	0.0	0.3	No	0.76	1.4	5.9
Liberal Alliance	1.3	27	18.5	66.7	7.4	7.4	0.8	No	0	1.4	5.9

Table 5 continued...

	The fulfilment of democratic expectations; higher values=worse fulfilled	Number of responses in the CCS data (candidates)	% of partisans	% of trustees	% of delegates	% of non-classifiables	Policy congruence, 0=high congruence, 10=low congruence	Socialist/communist/social democratic party	Ratio of representation in government in the four preceding electoral terms	Country means for the fulfilment of democratic expectations	Number of effective parties
<i>Germany</i>											
Social Democratic Party	2.0	151	19.9	56.3	9.3	14.6	0.9	No	0.57	2.1	4.8
Christian Democratic Union / Christian Social Union ¹	1.9	163	9.3	75.5	8.4	6.8	0.5	No	0.42	2.1	4.8
Free Democratic Party	1.8	143	6.3	77.6	5.6	10.5	0.1	No	0.21	2.1	4.8
Alliance 90 / Greens	2.3	151	4.6	79.5	8.0	7.9	0.4	No	0.36	2.1	4.8
Left Party	2.7	137	13.1	51.8	23.4	11.7	1.3	Yes	0	2.1	4.8
<i>Iceland</i>											
Social Democratic Alliance	2.8	74	10.8	58.1	16.2	14.9	0.7	Yes	0.15	2.6	4.2
Progressive Party	2.4	65	16.9	61.5	7.7	13.9	0.5	No	0.93	2.6	4.2
Independence Party	2.5	56	8.9	73.2	7.1	10.7	0.3	No	0.98	2.6	4.2
Left Green Movement	2.6	68	13.2	52.9	17.7	16.2	1.4	No	0.09	2.6	4.2
Civic Movement	3.2	63	6.3	63.5	25.4	4.8	0.4	No	0	2.6	4.2
<i>Ireland</i>											
	0.0										
Fianna Fáil	1.4	42	57.1	14.3	7.1	21.4	1.7	No	0.85	1.7	3.1
Fine Gael	1.6	36	44.4	30.6	8.3	16.7	0.5	No	0.21	1.7	3.1
Labour Party	1.9	17	47.1	17.7	23.5	11.8	1.1	Yes	0.32	1.7	3.1
Green Party	1.7	28	53.6	28.6	14.3	3.6	1.9	No	0	1.7	3.1
Sinn Féin	1.9	12	66.7	0.0	16.7	16.7	2.5	No	0	1.7	3.1
<i>Netherlands</i>											
Christian Democratic Appeal	1.3	30	56.7	30.0	0.0	13.3	0.7	No	0.48	1.5	5.5
PvdA Labour Party	1.4	21	33.3	47.6	9.5	9.5	0.2	Yes	0.51	1.5	5.5
Peoples Party for Freedom and Democracy	1.3	26	30.8	46.2	15.4	7.7	0.2	No	1	1.5	5.5
Green Left	1.6	11	27.3	72.7	0.0	0.0	0.8	No	0	1.5	5.5
Socialist Party	1.7	25	64.0	28.0	0.0	8.0	2.5	Yes	0	1.5	5.5
Democrats 66	1.5	18	22.2	72.2	0.0	5.6	0.5	Yes	0.69	1.5	5.5
Christian Union	1.4	9	55.6	33.3	0.0	11.1	1.9	No	0	1.5	5.5
SGP Political Reformed Party	1.4	11	63.6	27.3	9.1	0.0	0.2	No	0	1.5	5.5
Party for the Animals	2.3	11	36.4	27.3	9.1	27.3	0.7	No	0	1.5	5.5

Table 5 continued...

	The fulfilment of democratic expectations; higher values=worse fulfilled	Number of responses in the CCS data (candidates)	% of partisans	% of trustees	% of delegates	% of non-classifiables	Policy congruence, 0=high congruence, 10=low congruence	Socialist/communist/social democratic party	Ratio of representation in government in the four preceding electoral terms	Country means for the fulfilment of democratic expectations	Number of effective parties
<i>Portugal</i>											
Left Bloc	4.3	41	12.2	39.0	39.0	9.8	1.8	Yes	0	3.2	3.1
Peoples Party	3.7	54	18.5	33.3	37.0	11.1	1.8	No	0	3.2	3.1
Democratic Unity Coalition	3.3	25	52.0	20.0	28.0	0.0	1.2	Yes	0	3.2	3.1
Social Democratic	2.7	49	26.5	42.9	22.5	8.2	1.2	Yes	0.23	3.2	3.1
Socialist	3.3	25	24.0	52.0	16.0	8.0	1.1	Yes	0.62	3.2	3.1
<i>Sweden</i>											
Center Party	1.1	196	38.8	37.8	16.3	7.1	0.3	No	0.14	1.3	4.5
Liberal Party	1.3	147	26.5	38.8	21.8	12.9	0.2	No	0.14	1.3	4.5
Christian Democrats	1.4	192	36.5	38.5	15.1	9.9	0.1	No	0.14	1.3	4.5
Green Party	1.4	197	21.8	42.1	27.4	8.6	0.5	No	0	1.3	4.5
Conservatives / Moderate party	1.2	256	46.9	24.6	17.6	10.9	0.4	No	0.14	1.3	4.5
Social Democrats	1.2	256	53.1	24.6	12.5	9.8	0.7	Yes	0.43	1.3	4.5
Sweden Democrats	1.8	25	60.0	24.0	12.0	4.0	0.0	No	0	1.3	4.5
Left Party	2.1	187	39.0	34.2	16.6	10.2	1.0	Yes	0	1.3	4.5
<i>Switzerland</i>											
Swiss People's Party	1.5	103	15.5	54.4	26.2	3.9	1.3	No	1	1.5	5.6
Social Democratic Party	2.1	167	15.0	67.1	9.6	8.3	1.3	Yes	1	1.5	5.6
FDP.The Liberals	1.3	124	12.1	62.9	21.8	3.2	0.5	No	1	1.5	5.6
Christian Democratic People's Party	1.1	131	9.2	55.0	31.3	4.5	0.4	No	1	1.5	5.6
Green Party	1.6	130	9.2	73.8	13.8	3.2	1.1	No	0	1.5	5.6
Green Liberal Party	1.4	72	4.2	70.8	20.8	4.2	0.5	No	0	1.5	5.6

¹ CSU and CDU were combined in the ESS data but two separate items in the CCS data. When calculating combined measures for CSU/CDU the data is weighted by the parties size in the parliament after the election covered in the CCS data (the 2009 general election in Germany).

Appendix II

Table 6. Regression model including an interaction term between policy congruence and the proportion of partisans

	B (std.error)
<i>% of party representatives who are:</i>	
Partisans	.00 (.01)
<i>Parties and party voters</i>	
Policy congruence	.66** (.24)
Interaction, policy congruence*partisans	-.01+ (.01)
<i>Party variables</i>	
Socialist/communist party/social democratic party	.23 (.15)
Representation in government	-.14 (.19)
Distance between party voters' mean on expectations about democracy and the country means	1.18*** (.29)
<i>Country variables</i>	
Number of effective parties	-.12* (.05)
Dummy variable for Belgium, Ireland and the Netherlands	.13 (.18)
Intercept	2.07*** (.34)
R ² :	.58

Note: Response variable is the fulfilment of party voters' democratic expectations with lower values indicating that they are worse fulfilled. Significance levels: +p<0.1; *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001. N=60 parties.